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Should monetary policy respond to asset prices?  This paper
analyzes a general equilibrium model with imperfect capital
markets and rigid nominal wages.  Within the context of this
model, there is a natural role for the benevolent central bank to
dampen the real effects of asset price movements.
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1. Introduction.
Should monetary policy respond to asset prices?  This is a classic question in monetary
policy.  This paper addresses this issue in the context of a general equilibrium model with
imperfect capital markets and nominal wage rigidities. The former assumption is what makes
the analysis interesting.  If markets are perfect and the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds, then
asset prices reflect current economic conditions but otherwise have no independent effect on
real activity.  A central bank response to asset prices would be appropriate only if these prices
helped predict the behavior of other variables of interest.
But if markets are not perfect, so that balances-sheet effects are relevant, then matters
may be quite different.  If movements in asset prices affect a firm’s ability to obtain financing,
then asset prices have a direct and causal effect on real activity.  Further, if asset price
fluctuations induce real activity fluctuations that are harmful to welfare, then there may be a
role for monetary policy to counter the asset price movements with changes in policy.
In the theoretical model presented below there are two types of infinitely-lived agents,
entrepreneurs and households.  Entrepreneurs produce output with the use of a technology that
is subject to exogenous productivity shocks.  Entrepreneurs are in need of financing from
households, but these loans are subject to a collateral constraint.  The entrepreneurs’ collateral
consists of previously acquired “trees”.  Trees generate an exogenous stream of dividends so
that the price of trees is exogenous.  Fluctuations in the price of trees will alter the ability of
the entrepreneur to finance activity.  These fluctuations are typically inefficient as the tree
price need not be correlated with the entrepreneurial productivity shocks.  Hence, it is welfare-
improving for the central bank to counter these tree price fluctuations with changes in policy.2
The theoretical literature that links capital market imperfections with a business cycle
model dates to the seminal work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989).  More recently, this model
has been extended to a standard real business cycle environment by Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997,1998,2001) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000).
1  These models share the
feature that capital market imperfections are modeled with the use of Townsend’s (1979)
costly-state-verification environment.  In contrast, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) outline a model
of inalienable human capital that generates a rigid collateral constraint.  In this paper we adopt
an environment similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
Bernanke and Gertler (1999,2001) address the efficacy of a central bank response to
asset prices in the model outlined in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000).  They conclude
that there is no need for a direct central bank response to asset prices.  We reach a different
conclusion.
There are three basic reasons for the differing results.  First, we conduct a standard
utility-based welfare analysis while Bernanke and Gertler (1999,2001) consider policies that
minimize output and/or inflation variability.  Second, Bernanke and Gertler (1999,2001)
analyze a sticky price model, while we consider a model with sticky nominal wages.  Third
this paper conducts a first-best analysis while Bernanke and Gertler starts with a Taylor-rule
and asks whether a Taylor-rule that also responds to asset prices is welfare improving.  In a
model with sticky prices a standard result is that stabilizing the price level is the optimal
policy.  In Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), a shock to asset prices increases aggregate
demand and thus drives up the price level.  Hence, a central bank that is responding to general
price inflation is already responding to asset price movements so that there is no need for a
                                                          
1 See also Cooley and Nam (1998), Cooley and Quadrini (1999), and Fisher (1999).3
direct response to asset prices.  Instead of responding to asset prices the central bank can
simply respond to price inflation but with a larger coefficient.  In our model with sticky
nominal wages, the appropriate policy is to respond to wage inflation.  But since the first-best
analysis requires stabilizing wage-inflation one has to respond to asset prices since the
coefficient on wage-inflation cannot be increased.
The next section develops the basic model.  Section 3 provides the main results on
optimal policy.  Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
The theoretical model consists of households and entrepreneurs.  We will discuss the
decision problems of each in turn.  In the case of households we will consider two variants of
the model: (i) a model in which nominal wages are perfectly flexible, and (ii) a model in
which nominal wages are sticky and adjust across time in a Calvo-style (1983) fashion.
2.a.  Households.
Households are infinitely lived, discounting the future at rate β .  Their period-by-
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where Ct denotes consumption and Lt denotes labor.  We choose this particular functional
form for convenience.  Each period the household chooses how much to consume, how much
to work, how much cash to loan to the entrepreneur, and how many real assets to acquire.  It is
helpful to think of this real asset as an apple tree that produces  t D  consumption goods at the
end of time t.  The exogenous dividend process is given by
D
t t D ss D t D D D 1 1 ) 1 ( + + + + − = ε ρ ρ .( 2 )
Note that we have made no assumptions regarding the nature of this stochastic process.  It
may or may not be correlated with the productivity level in the production process as defined
later.  Tree shares trade at a share price of  t q  at the beginning of the period (before the time-t
dividend is paid).  Hence, the household’s intertemporal budget constraint is given by
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t L w P f q P D f P B R M M B f q P C P + + + + ≤ + + + − + 1 1 , (3)
where  t P  is the price of the consumption good,  t f  is the consumer’s tree purchases in time t,
t M  denotes cash holdings at the beginning of period t, and wt is the real wage.  The
household also supplies one-period, risk-less cash loans to entrepreneurs, t B , at gross nominal
interest rate t R .
The household’s consumption purchases face the following cash-in-advance
constraint:
() t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t X L w P f q P M C P D q f P B + + + ≤ + − + − 1 , (4)
where Xt denotes the time-t monetary injection.   Notice that the household engages in
financial market transactions before proceeding to the goods market so that (4) is net of these
financial market transactions.  For simplicity we assume that dividends are available within5
the period to purchase the consumption good (equivalently, dividends can be directly
consumed by the household). The household’s first order conditions are 
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Equation (5) is the labor supply equation, where η  is the labor supply elasticity.  Equation (6)
is the Fisherian nominal interest rate decomposition (the real rate is constant at 1/β ).  Equation








t t D E q β . (8)
The asset price depends only upon the exogenous dividend process.  We have purposely
structured the model so that the nominal rate has no direct effect on labor supply nor on tree
prices.
2.b. Households with sticky nominal wages.
In contrast to the case of flexible nominal wages, suppose instead that households are
monopolistic suppliers of labor and that nominal wages are adjusted in a Calvo-style (1983)




t t t w z L = . (9)6
The variable zt is the monopoly distortion as it measures how far the household’s marginal
rate of substitution is from the real wage.  In the case of perfectly flexible but monopolistic
wages, zt = z is constant and less than unity.  The smaller is z, the greater is the monopoly
power.  In the case of sticky wages, zt is variable and moves in response to the real and
nominal shocks hitting the economy.  Erceg et al. (2000) demonstrate that in log deviations
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where 
W
t π~ is time-t nominal wage growth (as a deviation from steady-state nominal wage
growth).
2.c. Entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs are also infinitely-lived with linear preferences over consumption.  They
are distinct from households in that they operate a production technology that uses labor to
produce output
t t t H A y = (11)
where t A  is the current level of productivity, and Ht is the amount of labor employed.  The
productivity level t A  is an exogenous random process given by
A
t t A ss A t A A A 1 1 ) 1 ( + + + + − = ε ρ ρ . (12)
The entrepreneur’s wage bill is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint:
e
t t t t M H w P ≤ (13)7
where
e
t M  denotes the firm’s cash holdings.  The entrepreneur begins each period with no
cash and thus borrows the needed cash from households at gross nominal rate Rt.  The
entrepreneur is also constrained by a borrowing limit.  In particular, the entrepreneur must be
able to cover his entire cash loan plus interest with collateral accumulated in advance.  We
will denote this collateral as  t n  for “net worth”.  The loan constraint is thus
t t t t n H w R ≤ . (14)
Notice that all variables are in real terms.
Why is the firm so constrained?  There are many possible informational stories that
would motivate such a constraint.  For example, suppose that the households first supply their
labor input, but that output is subsequently produced if and only if the entrepreneur provides
his unique human capital to the process.  We now have a classic hold-up problem in which the
entrepreneur could ex post force households to accept lower wage payments, for otherwise
nothing will be produced.  These problems can be entirely avoided if the household requires
cash up front, i.e., restriction (13).   But what is to prevent the entrepreneur from playing the
same game with the lenders of the cash used to finance (13)?  These lenders protect
themselves from a loan hold-up by requiring the collateral constraint (14).
We can easily enrich this story by assuming that there exists financial institutions that
intermediate these cash loans between households and entrepreneurs.  For example, suppose
that these intermediaries provide within-period financing to entrepreneurs, and that this
financing is used by firms to pay households.  The intermediary, however, is concerned about
the hold-up problem, and thus limits its’ lending to the firm’s net worth.  Hence, we once
again have the collateral constraint (14).   Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) use a similar constraint.
See Hart and Moore (1994) for a complete discussion of the hold-up problem.8














The demand for labor varies inversely with the real wage but is positively affected by the level
of net worth.  Entrepreneurs that have more collateral are able to employ more labor because
hold-up problems are less severe.  The binding collateral constraint implies that the marginal
product of labor is greater than the real wage (i.e., the firm would like to hire more labor but is
collateral-constrained).
The entrepreneurs’ sole source of net worth is previously acquired ownership of apple
trees.  If we let  1 − t e  to denote the number of tree shares acquired at the beginning of time  1 − t ,
then time t net worth is given by
t t t q e n 1 − = . (16)
The entrepreneur’s budget constraint is given by
t t t t t t t t t t t
e
t H R w H A D e q e q e c − + + = + − 1 . (17)
Using the binding loan constraint, we can rewrite this as
t t t t t t
e
t H A D e q e c + = + (18)
Because of these profit opportunities from net worth, the entrepreneur would like to
accumulate trees until the constraint no longer binds. To prevent this from happening we
assume that entrepreneurs discount the future at a higher rate than do households so that their
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A
q E D q γ β . (19)9
The left-hand side is the cost of acquiring another tree in time-t.  The right-hand side is the
return from that tree in time t+1.  It provides a collateral value of qt+1 which can be used to














 >1, where the inequality arises from the binding
collateral constraint.  To offset this extra return, we will choose γ  < 1 so that both the
household and entrepreneur hold trees in the steady-state.  We can use the binding collateral




t t t e
L A
E D q
1 1 + + = − γ β
or equivalently
() 1 1 ) ( + + = − t t t t t t L A E D q e γ β (20)
2.d. Equilibrium.
There are four markets in this theoretical model: the labor market, the tree market, the
loan market, and the money market. The labor market clears with  t t L H = .  The equilibrium
tree price is given by (8), while the shares sum to one, et + ft = 1.  The loan market clears at
e
t t M B = .  Finally, the money market clears with the household holding the per capita money
supply intertemporally.  In what follows we assume that monetary policy is defined by a path
for the gross nominal interest rate t R .  The implied path of inflation comes from the Fisher
equation (6), while the passive money supply behavior (the Xt process) can be backed out of
the binding cash-in-advance constraint.10
2.e. Log-linearizing the model.
Because the model is relatively simple, it is convenient to express the equilibrium in
terms of log-deviations.  Below the ~’s represent percentage deviations from the steady-state.
) ~ ~ (
~
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D
t t D t D D 1 1
~ ~
+ + + = ε ρ (29)
Equations (21)-(22) describe labor supply behavior.  Equation (23) follows from the
definition of the real wage.  In the case of flexible wages,  0 ~ = t z for all t so that (22)-(23) are
not relevant.  Equation (24) is the Fisher equation, while (25)-(26) describe entrepreneurial
behavior.  Equation (25) is the log-linear version of (20).  Equation (26) follows from the
assumed binding collateral constraint (15).  Finally the exogenous shocks are given by (27)-
(29).  To close the model we need only define monetary policy.11
If the collateral constraint were not binding, equations (25)-(26) would be replaced
with the entrepreneur’s first order condition for labor.  The labor demand equation in the
model without agency costs is given by
t t t R w A
~ ~ ~
+ =       (26b)
Note that the real wage is not simply the marginal productivity of labor but is distorted by the
nominal interest rate, Rt.  This is because there is a CIA constraint: the entrepreneur must
borrow cash in order to cover the workers’ wage bill (13).
There are two distinct distortions operating in the model. The first is the monopoly
distortion, zt, which acts like a fluctuating shadow wage tax on labor supply.  Since zt < 1
employment will be less than is socially efficient.  Faster (slower) nominal wage growth
lowers (increases) the distortion serving to increase (decrease) employment.  The second
distortion comes from the collateral constraint.  By assumption firms must have collateral
outstanding to pay off the loans which are needed to acquire the cash necessary to pay workers
before production starts.  This distortion acts like a fluctuating shadow wage tax on
entrepreneurs.  Increases (decreases) in net worth decrease (increase) this implicit tax.
Similarly changes in the nominal interest rate cause this distortion to fluctuate.  Decreases in
the interest rate decrease the distortion since entrepreneurs can make larger loans for a given
amount of collateral.  If net worth is ample enough so that the loan constraint is not binding
then the nominal interest rate will still distort the economy due to the CIA-constraint on the
wage bill (see (26b)).12
3. Optimal Policy.
What is the optimal response of the nominal interest rate to productivity and dividend
shocks?  To answer such a question we need a welfare criterion.  The most natural choice in
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where the equality follows from the fact that total time-t consumption must equal the total
supply of time-t consumption goods.   This supply comes from those goods produced using
the entrepreneur’s production technology, and the dividends that are produced by the apple
tree.  The linear preferences in consumption imply that the distribution of consumption is
irrelevant so that the only choice variable in Vt is employment.  Maximizing Vt with respect to
Lt yields the following optimality condition
η
t t A L = (31)
We will call this outcome the first-best as the welfare criterion cannot be made larger.
We will proceed in two steps.  First, we will take as given the steady-state level of the
nominal interest rate and construct the policy rule that will achieve (31) in deviations form,
t t A L
~ ~ η = .
We will refer to this as the “optimal deviations policy”.  We will assume that the steady-state
level of the nominal interest rate is sufficiently large so that the zero nominal interest rate
bound is never violated.  But by focusing on deviations, we are ignoring the possibility that
the optimal policy may be described by following a Friedman rule in which the nominal13
interest rate is set to zero, i.e., the steady-state nominal rate is zero.  Hence, we first solve for
optimal policy given that the steady state gross nominal interest rate exceeds one, Rss > 1.  As
a second step we will consider the more general question of optimal policy in which the
nominal interest rate may occasionally or always be set to zero.
3.a. Optimal Deviations with Flexible Wages.
In the case of flexible wages so that  0 ~ = t z for all t, we can easily solve for the
equilibrium level of employment:
)
~ ~ ~ (
1
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Substituting (28) into (25) we have
( ) 1 1
~ ~ ~ ~
+ + + + − = t t t t D t L A E q e ρ . (33)
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Contemporaneous employment does not respond to shocks to productivity, At (see
(32)).  This is a manifestation of the collateral constraint.  When productivity is high the firm
would like to expand employment but is unable to do so because of the need to finance current
activity with current collateral.  Thus, the collateral constraint limits the ability of the firm to
respond to shocks.   But the collateral constraint causes employment to respond to tree price
shocks.  This is inefficient in a welfare sense as these shocks need not be correlated with
aggregate productivity.14
We can now easily back out the interest rate policy that allows the economy to respond
to shocks efficiently.  Substituting the optimal labor behavior (31) into (32) we have:
t t t t A e q R
~
) 1 ( ~ ~ ~
1 η + − + = − . (35)
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1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + − + − − = t t t t t t t A E A q E q R η . (36)
What are the properties of this optimal-deviations monetary policy?  When there is a
positive shock to productivity At, the central bank should lower the nominal interest rate so
that employment can expand in an efficient manner.  A constant interest rate policy does not
allow this because of the collateral constraint. This procyclical interest rate policy overcomes
the collateral constraint and allows the economy to respond appropriately.
In contrast, if there is a shock to share prices that drives up qt, the central bank should
increase the interest rate by enough to keep employment constant.  It is inefficient for
employment to respond to these dividend shocks, and the central bank can ensure no response
by raising the nominal rate in response.
Notice that the optimal policy is i.i.d.  Policy need only respond to innovations in the
shocks.  This is because the entrepreneur varies his tree accumulation decision in response to
any anticipated level of productivity or tree prices (see (25)).
3.b. Optimal Deviations with Sticky Wages and no Agency Costs.
In this section we examine optimal policy in the model with sticky wages but where
the collateral constraint is not binding so that labor demand is given by (26b).  Combining
(26b) and (30) implies  t t z R ~ ~
= .  That is, optimal policy should eliminate the net distortion15
(z/R).  While an interest rate rule given by t t w R ~ − = will support the first-best, this policy rule
rule leads to real indeterminacy and thus is subject to welfare-reducing sunspot fluctuations.
But, we can achieve determinacy and optimal deviations with the following rule: 
W
t t R π τ ~ ~
=
where τ  = ∞ .  In equilibrium, wage inflation, zt, and the nominal rate will be pegged.  This is
also the optimal interest rate policy in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) in the case in which
only nominal wages are sticky.
3.c. Optimal Deviations with Sticky Wages and Agency Costs.
Substituting this optimal labor behavior into (25) and eliminating wt using (21) we can
back out the interest rate policy that will support (30):
t t t t t z A e q R ~ ~
) 1 ( ~ ~ ~
1 + + − + = − η . (33)
With flexible wages ( 0 ~ = t z ) this is just (31).  Similarly with constant net worth it stabilizes
the net distortion R/z.  Thus optimal policy in a model with both agency costs and sticky
wages is simply a combination of the optimal policy with each distortion individually.  Once
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1 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + + − + − − + = t t t t t t
w
t t A E A q E q R η π τ . (34)
where τ  = ∞ .
Notice that despite the fact that there are two distinct distortions – one from sticky
wages and the other from binding collateral constraints – both distortions can be eliminated16
with one policy instrument.  The reason is because the monetary policy rule that eliminates the
distortion from sticky wages is in equilibrium a constant interest rate.  It is not achieved,
however, by pegging the interest rate, a policy rule which would be indeterminate.  It is
achieved by responding super aggressively to nominal wage inflation which uniquely selects
out of the interest rate peg equilibria the one that eliminates the sticky wage distortion.
3.d. First-Best Monetary Policy.
Thus far we have concentrated on an economy where the steady state or average
nominal interest rate is given at Rss > 1.  The question is whether the Friedman rule where the
interest rate is pegged at zero might be optimal.  Since nominal interest rates cannot be
negative with a zero nominal interest rate the central bank cannot respond to asset-price and
technology shocks so that labor cannot respond to shocks efficiently.  This is the cost of
persuing such a policy.  But the benefit is that a lower nominal interest rate relaxes the
collateral constraint and thus increases average employment.  Because of the collateral
constraint and the monopoly distortion (z < 1) there is too little employment in this economy.
In this section we show that because a Fiedman rule expands employment it is the optimal
first-best policy.














t R  where τ  = ∞
and 
w π is the wage-inflation peg consistent with R=1.
2  In equilibrium
w w
t π π = and  1 = t R .
                                                          
2 We are ignoring some serious implementational issues associated with this rule.  Although in equilibrium this
rule will result in an interest rate peg out of equilibrium the public must believe that any downward deviation in
nominal wages will be met with an aggressive cut in the interest rate and thus they must believe that the interest
rate can be negative.17








































1 min  where again τ  = ∞  and 
w π is
now the wage-inflation peg consistent with R>1.  With a little rearranging it is easy to see that









































Therefore employment is always greater with the Friedman rule.  Welfare will also be
higher because V is concave and maximized when 
η
t t A L = .
The conclusion that (34) defines optimal policy when R > 1 is also subject to another
caveat.  Although the above policy allows the economy to respond to shocks efficiently it may
be optimal because of non-linear effects for τ  < ∞  so that zt fluctuates.  In this case


































Although movements in zt are inefficient they allow average employment to be higher
since z and A are positively correlated.  Note that this occurs, however, because the average
interest rate under this second policy is lower than it is with zt constant.  It would not arise in
the second best analysis if the average interest rate were given instead of the steady state
interest rate.18
4. Conclusion.
This paper addresses the question of how monetary policy should be conducted in a
world in which in which asset prices have a direct effect on real activity because of binding
collateral constraints.  In this environment if the average interest rate is constrained to be
positive – perhaps because of fiscal considerations -- there is a welfare-improving role for a
monetary policy that will actively respond to asset price and productivity shocks.  This activist
interest rate policy allows the economy to respond to shocks in a Pareto efficient manner.  By
assumption, monetary policy cannot eliminate the long run impact of the informational
constraint, but it can smooth the fluctuations in this constraint.  This smoothing is welfare-
improving.19
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